LIMITS OF THE JUDGE'S DISCRETIONARY POWER IN JUSTIFYING CRIMINAL JUDGMENTS

Abstract

This study aims to provide an in-depth examination of the discretionary authority vested in felony court judges during criminal proceedings, particularly with respect to the evaluation of evidence and the formation of judicial conviction. The research is grounded in the relevant provisions of Iraq legislation, as well as in pertinent jurisprudential and judicial interpretations. It proceeds from the premise that the criminal evidentiary system is fundamentally based on the principle of judicial freedom in assessing and weighing evidence; however, such freedom is not absolute. Rather, it is circumscribed by substantive and procedural legal constraints designed to ensure the integrity of criminal justice and the protection of the defendant’s rights.
The study explores the legal framework governing judicial discretion, beginning with the foundations of the doctrine of personal conviction and the extent to which the presumption of innocence and the requirement of judicial certainty influence its application. It further addresses the conditions related to the lawfulness, sufficiency, and coherence of evidence, in addition to the obligation imposed on the judge to provide adequate reasoning that clearly reveals the logical and legal grounds upon which the judgment is based.
Moreover, the research analyzes the scope of appellate and cassation review over the discretionary decisions of felony judges, clarifying that higher courts do not ordinarily interfere with the judge’s personal conviction unless such conviction is tainted by legal error, inadequate reasoning, or reliance on unlawful or insufficient evidence. Through an analytical review of selected judicial decisions, the study identifies the circumstances under which higher courts may overturn judgments, particularly where judicial conviction reflects ambiguity, flawed reasoning, or improper use of discretion.
The study concludes that the discretionary authority of felony judges constitutes a fundamental tool for achieving criminal justice, yet its exercise must remain within well-defined legal boundaries that ensure a balance between judicial independence and the guarantees of a fair trial. It further asserts that appellate oversight serves as an essential safeguard to ensure the proper application of judicial discretion and to prevent unwarranted encroachment upon the presumption of innocence or unjustified expansion of criminal liability.