

**FORMER SOVIET AUTHORITIES' POLICY OF RELOCATING  
POPULATION IN UZBEKISTAN DURING 1925-1935**

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ABSTRACT	KEYWORDS
One of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century was the policy of collectivization of agriculture by the former Soviet authorities. The result of Stalin's prescribed and deformed collectivization was unprecedented repression. Collectivization and the "extermination of the Kulaks as a class" led to the forced deportation of almost two million peasants to the remote northern and sparsely populated areas of the country, the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, and ultimately the destruction of agriculture. The policy of collectivization in 1932 and 1933 resulted in a devastating famine that killed millions of peasants and led to a new wave of rural repression.	

**Introduction**

O. Jamolov's article "From the history of collectivization of agriculture in Uzbekistan" [2] shows that as a result of socialist industrialization, collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution, Uzbekistan has become an economically and culturally developed socialist republic in a short historical period, which was once on the verge of poverty. Emphasizing that Uzbek peasants, directly believing in the advantages of collective farming, can no longer imagine life outside the collective farm, the great experience of socialist transformation of agriculture accumulated in national republics such as Uzbekistan, bypassing the capitalist stage of social development, emphasizes that it is of great theoretical and practical importance for countries transitioning to socialism. At the same time, the benefits of collectivization can be proved on the basis of facts, and the fact that the literature created at that time does not cover the information is criticized. For example, despite the fact that G. Rizayev's work "40 years for Uzbekistan's agriculture" [3] is devoted to the results of the development of agriculture in Uzbekistan during the period of the former Soviet power, he mentions that issues of the history of collectivization, specific conditions of the socialist transformation of the Uzbek countryside have not been deeply analyzed. And in the second volume of the history of the Uzbek SSR [4], it was shown that the information was not disclosed sufficiently.

In N. S. Tarkhova's book "Red Army and Stalin's collectivization, 1928-1933" [5], Russian historiography examines the level of participation of the Red Army in the implementation of Stalin's policy of complete collectivization and the destruction of kulaks as a class in the late 1920s and 1930s. The research is based on large archival materials and allows to observe the main stages of the

development and implementation of the agrarian policy of that time. It only shows the number of collective farms and families of Red Army soldiers relocated to Uzbekistan.

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

During the implementation of the Soviet policy of collectivization in Uzbekistan, many Russian families moved here. 25,000 workers from Moscow, Leningrad, Ivano-Voznesensk and other cities were sent to Uzbekistan in order to implement the policy of Russification and great statesmanship under the pretext of helping rural workers in the work of collectivization. In fact, instead of 25,000 people, 27,119 people were sent. From February 1930 to January 1931, 458 people received permits to come to Uzbekistan. Another 400 people were planned to arrive here during 1931. Of the 433 paratroopers who arrived initially, 149 were from Moscow, 84 from Leningrad, and 200 from Ivano-Voznisiysk. 76 of these proactive but uninvited "guests" were sent to Samarkand, 56 to Tashkent, Andijan and 33 to Kashkadarya regions. 33 of the foreigners were immediately employed in the central administration of the republic [10]. Together with 353 workers who "leapt" from the republic, they went to the villages and started to develop agriculture. 139 of these workers, completely ignorant of the delicate aspects of agriculture, were elected as chairman, deputy chairman and members of the board of collective farms. 57 of them held district-level leadership positions. The rest were elected secretaries of primary party organizations in collective farms [7].

Most of the 25,000 people had no knowledge of agriculture, they sincerely believed in the extraordinary power of the kolkhoz structure to achieve a full life and prosperity through the Stalinist use of the land. Most of the twenty-five thousand people who came to Uzbekistan could not get along well with the native population for a long time. In the literature written in the spirit of that time, their activities were highly praised, they were recognized as assistants to local workers and main enthusiasts in the development of agriculture. In reality, many farms to which "25 thousand" were ceremonially sent did not give them housing and did not listen to their complaints. For example, Martinov, a worker sent from Ivano-Voznisiysk to the Okhunboboyev collective farm of Namangan district, gives information about following: "The executive committee of the Namangan district was not aware of the arrival of "25 thousand people" and, of course, did not create any conditions for their accommodation". Blokhin and Shyyerbakov, who were sent from Tver, complained that they did not have proper housing for several months due to lack of adequate conditions. The letter of a worker named Andryeyev contains the following lines: "Nobody has business with us here. I was transferred to a collective farm, and I could not find a penny for my fare [11]. "I make a living not by salary, but by begging from my friends." Another document mentions that on September 3, 1930, a fight took place between the Russian mechanic Garmash and the Uzbek instructor Halimov at the silk weaving factory in Bukhara. The reason for the fight was the loss of a stopwatch. As a result, the Russian plumbers refused to go to work at the factory, fearing that the Uzbeks would beat them. On September 3, according to the doctor, Garmash was in a state of mild intoxication. About his arrest and the lack of educational work in connection with the elimination of national enmity among factory workers (even among party members), Central Asian OGPU PP reported on September 24, 1930 in a special report about confrontation between Russian and Uzbek workers [12].

In a special resolution adopted by the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the USSR and the College of People's Commissars of the RCI on May 13, 1931, the great role of the "25 thousand" as organizers of the construction of the collective farm was emphasized, and their rude treatment in some

cases, unreasonably partisan and prosecution, it is noted that there is an unsatisfactory supply of food and manufactured goods. It was noted that the adoption of this decision played a key role in securing twenty-five thousand people as permanent collective farm personnel [13].

The Soviet government and the Communist Party effectively helped the peasants in the implementation of collectivization, more than 700 workers from the "25 thousand" from the central cities of Russia worked in the collective farms of Uzbekistan. A number of associations of industrial enterprises of the RSFSR sponsored individual districts and regions of Uzbekistan. For example, textile workers in Moscow - Kashkadarya district, Tver - Gijduvan district, Ivanovo-Voznesensk - Andijan district, etc. They constantly went to the villages to provide organizational and technical support to the local Soviets in the implementation of collectivization of the enterprises of Tashkent, Samarkand, Ko'kan and other industrial centers of the republic [2]. In 1930, 26 brigades of 458 people from Central Russia came to Uzbekistan to "help" the spring planting campaign. In addition to carpenters, blacksmiths, and locksmiths, there were many political workers in these brigades, who in the early 1930s perfectly developed a plan to turn Uzbekistan into a "red" colony and a cash cow of the Center, and fully implemented collectivization and "Gulag" campaigns in order to carry out the aforementioned plan [7]. In the information report of the representative of the People's Commissar of Labor at the meeting of the "Central Executive Committee" and the Secretariat of the Presidium of the UZSSR on January 20, 1927 about the unemployment situation in Uzbekistan, the total number of unemployed people in October 1925 constituted 13,900, in January 1926 17,600 people, and on October 1, 1926 19,600 people, 25,000 people on December 1, the number of unemployed increased by 41% during the fiscal year and 60% during the calendar year 1926. Meanwhile, the number of unemployed in the main nation was said to have more than tripled from 1,142 on October 1, 1925, to 3,526 on October 1, 1926. The increase in unemployment among the major nations was noted to be stronger than the increase in unemployment among Europeans, with the proportion of the unemployed in the major nations rising from 8% in October 1925 to 18% of the total unemployed in October 1926. These sources of unemployment include:

1. Surplus labor force in the countryside, because not all peasants can be used in agriculture and the fact that it is a factor that increases unemployment.
2. The reasons why the population growth was stronger than the growth of the employed labor force were mentioned.

47 percent of the unemployed are unskilled and the growth of production requires skilled labor [14].

After mass purges of those who opposed collectivization and the displacement of tens of thousands of peasant families from their permanent residences, the situation in the countryside deteriorated significantly. The famine of 1932-1933 aggravated the situation. Hastily created young collective farms and state farms could not meet the planned indicators of procurement. In this regard, due to the fact that the help of army units was very necessary not only as a patronage, but also as a state task, the establishment of Red Army collective farms not only in the Far East, according to the decision of the International Council of the RSFSR on May 17, 1931, in Leningrad and Western regions, in the Karel ASSR, 35 Red an army collective farm was established and 1,500 Red Army families were placed in them, which was equal to 4,500 people. The plan of 1932, approved by the decision of the People's Committee of the USSR on February 21, 1932, established the establishment of 58 Red Army collective farms in agreement with the Pu RKKA, and the accommodation of 3,475 Red Army families in them. In addition, it is envisaged to add 6778 Red Army families to the Red Army collective farms established

in 1931. In 1932, 10,253 Red Army families were assigned to the general plan of migration. The actual figures corresponded to the following figures: during 1932, 46 new Red Army collective farms were established and 7,407 Red Army families (22,221 people) were resettled. 5 Red Army kolkhozes in Kazakhstan and 5 Red Army kolkhozes in ZSFSR, the planned resettlement of 250 Red Army families in 1932 was not implemented. In 1933, building materials for the development of these works were partially prepared, and although the establishment of new Red Army collective farms was not foreseen by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR and the Red Army PU, organizational and economic strengthening of the existing Red Army collective farms and the newly built collective farms. An action plan was developed to include 3,550 Red Army families and distributed by republic as follows: RSFSR — 1,700, Ukrainian SSR — 850, BSSR — 450, ZSFSR — 250, Uzbekistan SSR — 100, Turkmenistan SSR — 100, Tajikistan SSR - 100.

According to the information of the Red Army PU, in 1933 there were 113 Red Army collective farms in the border regions of the USSR (except the Far East), of which there was 1 Red Army collective farm consisting of 60 families in Uzbekistan [5].

During the policy of full collectivization of the countryside, the level of involvement of the troops in the construction of the collective farm was not limited to the training of personnel for agriculture and the establishment of collective farms of the Red Army, which was discussed only from the top, but also to help the village - the planting of units and Although participation in the harvest has always been considered an integral part of the general political work in the army, recognizing the political importance of this field of work, the commanders of military districts have repeatedly diverted the attention of the military leadership to field work. The commanders of the districts at the expanded meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR in November 1933 stated that the compulsory public agricultural works often had a negative effect on the combat readiness of the troops [5].

In January 1927, only 50 million tons of grain products were available in local reserve, and the Central government was supposed to supply 82 million quintals of grain for seed supply in 1927-28 for the production of grain products in agriculture. There were interruptions in the supply of bread in the cities, long queues appeared in shops, riots occurred in some places. A difficult situation had arisen in the regions specialized in cotton cultivation. In particular, only 40% of the grain supply plan to Uzbekistan was completed in January.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

In such a situation, the government applied administrative measures: Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR entered into force, according to which the punishment for "up to three years of imprisonment for persons guilty of buying, deliberately increasing the price of goods" was established. By using violent measures, the authorities were able to carry out the grain preparation plan and collect grain seeds for a new crop.

But the peasants' reaction to coercive measures was to reduce crops. In 1928, crops in the North Caucasus decreased by 9.2%, and in Ukraine by 7.7%. Because farmers did not begin replanting nearly 1 million hectares of fall crops, the 1928 harvest was reduced, which in turn meant that the grain procurement problem would reappear [6].

As Uzbekistan was transformed into a cotton base of the Soviet state from the end of the 20s, wheat and barley lands were also allocated for cotton, and grain products began to be brought to Uzbekistan

from grain-producing regions of Russia. In 1932, due to the fact that the RSFSR did not supply Uzbekistan with grain at all, the famine brought the specter of cash death to every household in our country. At the end of 1921 - the beginning of 1922, when the famine started in Russia, the horrors of the famine escaped the Uzbek people because the cotton monopoly had not yet been established in Turkestan. But at the beginning of January 1922, the Council of People's Commissars of the republic decided to introduce the "Hunger" tax in Turkestan. It is interesting that this decision was issued because of the famine that started in Russia, and the people of Turkestan raised food from their livelihood and sent food products to the Russians. During the famine of 1932-1933, the government of Uzbekistan, in addition to the difficulties of solving its own problems, was forced to catch fish from the Aral Sea and send them to the central regions of the USSR that fell into a vortex of hunger [7].

Anyone who tried to take home a handful of wheat or barley or ate it from the threshing floor was considered a criminal, tried and sent to prison camps. Since cotton is considered a valuable strategic commodity and exported, even five or six grams of cotton left in the vats in the cotton field or spilled on the road was regarded as treason against the state property, and from young children to the heads of the collective farms were brutally punished. In this way, the Soviet state both starved the people and threw them into prison camps on charges of theft.

The harvest in 1932 was only about 12% below the average, perhaps the first artificially induced famine in history. Despite the fact that the production of grain in the former union was 12% less than in previous years, the Soviet state did not allocate any part of this grain to domestic needs - to supply the people with grain, but exported it and began to purchase plants and factories, technical equipment for industrial enterprises built in the country. As a result, in the southern regions of the Soviet country - the exiled Uzbek "Gulags" of Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Lower Volga and North Kazakhstan, famine and epidemics caught hundreds of thousands of people. According to the information disclosed in recent years, 25-30 mln. people suffered from hunger.

On March 29, 1935, a special decision "On the labor force needs of the Uzbek SSR in 1935 and how to meet them" was adopted. This need has arisen as a result of the imprisonment of thousands of people with flimsy pretexts. Naim Karimov, in his work entitled "The causes and factors of the origin of the Great Massacre", the leadership of the republic, by adopting this decision, intended to release some of the imprisoned innocent people or to attract them to the labor fronts of the republic. In any case, it seems that the leaders of the government, on the one hand, were looking for measures to increase the economic potential of the republic, and on the other hand, to keep the prisoners who were in the camps of Central Asia instead of sending to the huge constructions such as the Belomorkanal and the Moscow-Volga canal, and to use their labor in the republic [7].

In 1924-1926, the number of workers in Uzbekistan increased by 49.3 percent. In 1926, the share of Uzbek workers decreased from 41% to 35%. The reason was related to the implementation of large-scale construction works, and the involvement of European workers in construction works. The slow growth of the number of national workers in the eastern national republics is mainly explained by the lack of skilled workers among the population of the main nation.

Until 1926, there were cases of manual introduction of local population into production by dismissing workers of other nationalities in Uzbekistan. Even at the beginning of 1926, the Localization Commission under the Central Election Commission of Uzbekistan sent 70 Uzbeks to Win Trust with the offer to hire them, and if there were no places, to reduce the number of Europeans. There is no information about unemployed Uzbeks in Uzbekistan.



In Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tatarstan, the cold attitude of Russian craftsmen towards the training of national workers was often noted. Here it was revealed that Russian workers believed that the training of workers of the main nationality would drive Russian workers out of production, and that it would become impossible to hire Russian children into factories as a result.

The percentage of Uzbeks in trade union bodies elected in 1926 in Uzbekistan were 43.5% in trade unions, 48.1% in central bodies, and 62.4% in districts. Moreover, Uzbeks constituted 27.8% of factory committees in Uzbekistan. The insignificance of trade union bodies is explained by the lack of enterprises and institutions with a large number of local workers and employees [8].

In Uzbekistan in 1931, 388 counter-revolutionary collective farms were liquidated. In 1931, 22,584 people were killed against the Soviets in Central Asia. In the first quarter of this year, 1324 people were repressed. In January-February, 1306 investigative cases against various counter-revolutionary elements were received.

There is almost no information on the supply of food and fodder to collective farms. There is some information about food difficulties, for example, in the Nur-Ota district of Uzbekistan, collective farmers in the Qitay-Chat village council were in dire need of bread. Millet and crushed root bread were eaten. Collective farmers made a living by selling household goods and exchanging them for bread. On this basis, 60 collective farms separated from village councils. The rest of the collective farmers also intended to leave as soon as the weather warmed up [9].

According to the operational plan of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR for resettlement in 1931 № 70/s, dated April 23, 1931, 3 200 families (17,600 people) in the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and 250 families (1,375 people) in Uzbekistan should be settled and their farms regulated. A total of 6,900,000 rubles were allocated for the relocation of Jewish workers, of which 1,900,000 rubles of bank loans were allocated to those relocated to Uzbekistan [8].

In 1930-1936, the former Soviet Union moved more than 600 Russian specialists for a long-term period to provide direct assistance in the training of the Uzbek working class working in higher education institutions and industrial enterprises of Uzbekistan [1].

## CONCLUSION

In short, it is no exaggeration to say that the Soviet government's policy of population resettlement has hindered the socio-economic, spiritual and educational development of our country. The implementation of such a national policy separated the Uzbek people from their national roots, became an obstacle to the growth of national self-awareness, and stifled feelings of national pride. It caused feelings of dissatisfaction with the existing system in the advanced part of the population. Later, these sufferings led to tragic events that took place in a number of regions. All these were the results of development without taking into account the historical and national characteristics of the republic and the interests of the Uzbek nation.

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