

ON TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
MODERN MILITARY CONFLICTS

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ABSTRACT	KEYWORDS
In article on the base of analysis main facts of the environment, determined new form and methods of the conduct defense. Defined the problem questions, determined basic confrontation, suggested the ways to their solutions.	Fighting attempt, mountain region, geographic and climate environment, mountain relief, mountain peak, shun radiation, high, factory, skills and ways, mines field and engineering obstacles, width of defence, depth of defense.

Introduction

The current military-political situation in the world is characterized by instability and many unpredictable dangers and threats.

In the course of the progressive development of mankind, weapons and military equipment are constantly being improved. In the 21st century, military robotic devices can be predicted to be widely used in land, air, sea and underwater warfare.

Based on the practical experience of conducting an armed conflict with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Russian high-ranking military leadership continues to make adjustments to the combat strategy and tactics, as well as plans to update the Combat Regulations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Russia's special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine showed that the nature of modern combat operations can take unpredictable forms, which often do not correspond to the rules of the current rules of engagement.

The combat manual is the primary document that guides commanders at all levels in organizing combat operations and directing troops in a military conflict zone. A 3-part practical combat manual contains rules for all situations in the life of military personnel.

The first part describes the actions of the regiment, brigade and division. The organization, personnel composition and tactics of these formations are classified information, therefore this part is closed. The second part contains instructions for company and battalion commanders. The third describes the actions

of a platoon, squad, tank. Combat operations during the Northern Military District of the Russian Federation in Ukraine are significantly different from the combat operations conducted by Soviet and Russian forces in recent decades. During the current conflict, Russian forces are facing a large regular army equipped with all types of conventional weapons, and the line of combat extends over a thousand kilometers. In this context, it was necessary to revise and update the current combat manual of the RF Armed Forces.

Until the mid-2000s, the Russian military led the USSR in combat manuals developed during the Cold War. This document contained information on how troops should behave when facing millions of troops in the European theater of operations.

During the war in Afghanistan, in which guerilla operations were conducted against the Soviet army, many rules of the basic combat document did not apply.

Troops had to develop new tactics on the spot through trial and error. This was related to the movement of military columns to avoid ambushes, the establishment of permanent deployment points and the planning of military operations. Later, the situation was repeated during two Chechen campaigns in Russia. Only after that, new rules of engagement were developed, taking into account the experience of local military conflicts.

The next version of the document, approved in 2014, was prepared during the period of military reforms at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. During this period, the troops were transferred from the division structure to the brigade structure, which was reflected in the documents, but this practice did not justify itself. The current edition of the combat manual of the Russian Federation was approved in 2017. It includes experiences gained during the battles in Syria. In particular, a lot of attention was paid to combat operations in the city, storming buildings, and the work of sniper pairs and groups. Instructions were given to the leadership of military higher educational institutions on the preparation and implementation of educational materials. In the context of the data presented, a number of military experts expressed their opinion on the renewal of the primary school document for military service. In the updated combat manual, it is necessary to use the latest types of weapons during modern conflicts, in particular UAVs, robot soldiers, etc. Now every unit starting a platoon has UAVs, which are used for artillery guidance, reconnaissance, radiation chemical protection troops and in the military police. A new and in-demand profession of UAV operator has appeared, which is not defined in the regulation. At the same time, the management and maintenance of the UAV is assigned to military personnel who are responsible for other areas of activity. At the same time, the experience of the special military operation in Ukraine showed that there was a need to change the location of the command posts, to move them to the rear, away from the zone of possible defeat by the enemy.

According to the regulations, the battalion command post is located 2 km away from the skirmish line, which easily falls within the limits of destruction of modern sniper weapons, even though the regimental command post is currently 8-10 kilometers away. Headquarters are the backbone of the battle, they must be protected and removed from affected areas. In addition, modern combat tactics are changing, but the changes are not yet reflected in the Battle Rules. According to the current legislation, the attack tactic involves passing a colored chain with a distance of 50 meters between the platoons. Now there is a practice of using 3 small attack groups operating autonomously in the combat zone in support of the main force, which is also not prescribed by law. In addition, the current Regulation does not deny the status of non-rational structures such as PMCs, volunteer units, and does not regulate interactions with the armed forces. It should be noted that many situations faced by Russian military personnel during

SVO are not reflected in the Regulations and require correction. However, there is no point in taking combat manuals and cutting them in haste. It is necessary to wait until the end of the special operation and make adjustments based on conscious and generalized experience. It can be explained by the fact that the principle of gaining new weapons and air superiority comes to the fore. It should also be noted that updating the rules of engagement is a hot topic, as these rules have never been revised since the conflict in Syria.

There have been significant changes in the use of UAVs, artillery, tanks, MLRS and other weapon systems. They led to a change in the role of infantry in the battle, and thus to a change in the tactics of armed battles. Martial arts themselves are changing, and from this comes far-sighted conclusions. In addition, not only infantry, but also tanks, artillery and support types should be shown.

Today, UAVs are directly involved in hostilities, and it should be taken into account that the new rules may take into account the coordination of units and the organization of their interaction, as well as updating the tactics of urban warfare, taking into account the use of compact UAVs. The new Regulation also mentions the establishment of intelligence and fire control, communication center innovations, automated control systems, anti-drone methods, air defense and electronic warfare.

Analysis of the course of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict shows that the current combat manual of the Russian Armed Forces does not fully correspond to the modern realities of war. Against this background, not only Russia, but also other countries draw conclusions based on the analysis of the results of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and make adjustments to their military doctrines, strategies and rules.

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